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CONSOLIDATED SPACE TEST CENTER
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT
SMALL SATELLITES
Lt. Col. David E. Smith, USAF
ABSTRACT
No analysis of small satellite programs is complete
without thorough considerat1on of the operational
concept that wi 11 support them. It is not uncommon
today that a space system1s lifecycle cost will show
that operating costs exceeded development and
production costs. This is part1cularly true for
programs that hope to reduce spacecraft expense by
transferring, to the ground, as much of the on-board
processing requirements as operat1onally feasible.
Facl1ity, hardware. software, maintenance, manning,
training, communications, on-orbit operat1ons and
launch costs all factor into the total operations
spending and must be prudently considered.
The Consolidated Space Test Center (STC) located in
Sunnyvale, California addresses these factors with an
important strength - experience. Over 25 years of
satellite operations history has prepared the STC for
the tremendous cha 11 enge of economi ca lly operat; ng
"one-of-a-kind" spacecraft prototypes or a large
constellat1on of spacecraft for a user community
increasingly constrained by limited funding. The STC
will meet this challenge through flexibility and
adaptation. Today, STC operated spacecraft are
supported through UHF. VHF, L-Band, and Unified
S-Band links. A world-wide network of permanent
ground stations is being continually upgraded and
supplemented by transportable assets capable of
remotely located operations. In addition to these
telemetry, tracking and commanding systems, the STC
is driving to develop a mission data reduction and
processing capability. These cost efficient systems
form the vanguard to an STC ability aimed at meeting
user requirements at all levels of resource
commitment and effort.

INTRODUCTI ON
One of the most important issues confronUng the Small Satellite
program community is the question "How will the Small Satellite
mission be accomplished on-orbit?".
No aspect of the Small
Satellite's conceptual development stands independent from this
fundamental operaUonal decision. A hypotheUcal Small Satellite's
orbit ;s significantly influenced by the operational decision as to
how and where a user will access spacecraft telemetry. Complexity of
the satellite's onboard software is completely tied to a tradeoff with
how much software and gener i c suppor t capabl1 ity wi 11 be prov i ded
ground operators. Even the' simple operaUonal determinaUon of the
satellite's desired lifetime waterfalls into reliability, spacecraft
size, hardware, software, orbit and other developmental compartments.
Despite the clear relaUonship between operaUons and satell ite
design, there are a surprising number of instances where a spacecraft
system was constructed with little attention paid to operaUonal
issues. Spacecraft are designed incompatible with existing satellite
networks necessitating costly network or spacecraft modifications late
in the development timelines. On-orbit support costs exceed program
budgets over time as satellite'S past their mission usefulness are
supported only because they are still operating.
One of the Small Satellite program's most important challenges will be
to recognize the intrinsic value of answering operational questions in
detail and subsequently incorporating those answers into their system
designs early. This paper is intended to address specific operational
area candidates for this early incorporaUon and to apprise the
community of an organization committed to supporting Small Satellite
development with operational expertise unmatched anywhere in the world
-- the Consolidated Space Test Center.
THE CONSOLIDATED SPACE TEST CENTER
For over 25 years the Consolidated Space Test Center (CSTC) has
operated numerous national space programs with scientific, civilian,
and military objectives. Recently. the CSTC has even supported the
satellites of foreign nations -- a testament to the Center's widely
recognized expertise. What began as a distinct research and
development effort now includes operations that routinely provide
on-orbit support to space assets implicitly relied on by operating
commands of the armed forces. In fact, as space systems and
spacecraft achieved reliability and standardhaUon, spending on
research and development efforts declined in favor of mission systems.
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Today, in an era of dynamic and demanding future spacecraft
requirements, the relative importance of strong research and
development programs is tremendously increasing. This reemphasis was
an important contributor to the formation of the Unified Space Command
and the division of rouUne mission operations and research and
development operaUons between two principle space centers. The
recently commissioned Consolidated Space Operations Center in Colorado
Springs will operate established and routine support satellHe
constellations wHh communication, navigaUon and weather missions.
The CSTC, located in Sunnyvale, California will serve as a redundant
node for these operations but more importantly, as an asset of the Air
Force System Command's Space Division, will become the focus of all
military sponsored space research and development operations and
orbital safety initiatives. The CSTC is executing a concerted program
to enhance its resources supporting this specific charter.
Both Centers make use of the Air Force Satellite Control Network, a
globally dispersed array of tracking stations. Spacecraft are
commanded from these stations, telemetry is retrieved, and the
tracking data they produce is used for ephemeriS determination and
prediction. This support is provided for satellites and the NASA STS
Orbiter flights and represents numerous programs. Scheduling of these
resources and resolution of schedule conflicts for R&D programs is a
service provided by the CSTC. AddHional Network assets are the
r ad i ome t ric can bra t i on fa c 11 H Y a t Camp Par ks, Ca l1f or ni a, and t he
Timing System at Sunnyvale for universal range timing data.
SMALL SATELLITES AND THE SPACE TEST CENTER
The Space Test Center is well equipped for support of space R&D, and
will become increaSingly so as the planned improvements are
implemented. The Center's greatest assets are its experienced crews
of controllers and analysts, who have supported space missions
launched on expendable rockets, deployed by the Orbiter, or flown as
sortie missions on the Orbiter. They have supported multiple
deployments and tests of ballistic systems. These crews, along with
program office operations people and contractor support, operate out
of secure Mission Control Centers at Sunnyvale. The Consolidated
Space Operations Center's coming on line will allow dedicaUon of
Mission Control Center resources at Sunnyvale to R&D support. These
Mission Control Centers will continue to have full access to the
Satellite Control Network and its scheduling operation. In addition.
they provide access to NASA resources, such as the Tracking and Data
Relay SatellHe System, by the resident programs. Communication
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networks l1nk the Control Centers to A1r Force and NASA centers and to
other test faciliUes, for both voice and data transm1ss10n. Each
center is be1ng equipped with dedicated process1ng equipment for
mission support. These processors host the upgraded Command and
Control Segment software wh1ch covers all generic aspects of normal
operation.
To the operators in these Control Centers, the size of the satellite
is, in 1tself, of no consequence. Standardized operational procedures
are directly applicable to space vehicles of any size. The mission of
the satellite dictates the nature of 1ts operation. This bears on an
1mportant subpoint of th1s paper: the influence of operations on the
life-cycle costs of a space program. The concept of deploying small
satell ites as a cost-saving measure must account for all cost
elements. It is not unusual for the operating costs of on-orbit
spacecraft to equal or exceed the initial development costs. At
present, the Air Force and NASA are, by necessity, focusing on launch
capability, and program planners commonly use the cost per pound to
orbit as a preliminary yardstick of program cost. Reduction of this
cost element has been the subject of intensive study by both agencies;
and of course, reducUon of payload weight is as legitimate an
approach as is reduction of the price per pound for lHting the
payload. Estimates of life-cycle costs are, however, a basic tenet of
the system engineering which produces space systems. Major cost
elements in operations must be identHied, and the program shaped
wherever possible to keep these costs at affordable levels.
PRE-LAUNCH AND SPACE FLIGHT ACTIVITIES
To develop a clear understanding of the costs of operating a space
vehicle, it is appropriate to step through the various activities
which the program office and the Space Test Center undertake leading
up to the operation, and those which comprise the flight itself after
deployment. These activities are typical for a small satellite tasked
with gathering scientific data, but apply at least in part to many
other mission profiles as well. {It should be noted, however, that
they do not apply to deployments of large numbers of vehicles over a
short period of time. Consolidated Space Test Center studies of SOl
and other large-scale deployment control requirements shows that a
major network upgrade is needed for these cases.} The activities are
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. The following text follows the sequence
of these figures.
Once a program concept has been formed, early mission planning is
essential, for orderly cataloging of the vehicle design and support
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requirements, and for estimating program costs. This planning is
embodied in an Operations Concept. The operational community can
provide consultaUve services at this stage which can lead to
substantial cost savings, although some design and mission tradeoffs
may be indicated. The Operations Concept ;s a living document which
develops along with the program.
Mission simulaUons should be performed early, particularly if the
data-taking process is strongly influenced by orbit parameters and
launch time. The Space Test Center can assist in this, and make
preliminary runs to aid in the orbit selection and to assure that the
likelihood of collision with 'other spacecraft or with orbiting debris
is insignificant.
Mission Control Center activation takes place well in advance of the
launch date, so that fl ight software and procedures can be well
polished and the necessary crew training accomplished. The latter
usually involves familiarizing Air Force and Mission Control Center
personnel with the mission and vehicle, and program crew members with
Consolidated Space Test Center and network operations.
Software preparation entails the development and test of mission
unique software, its interface with the Mission Control Center common
user software, data base preparation, and formulation of operating
procedures for its use. A resource use plan is generated, as is a
search plan for initial acquisition of a vehicle deployed by an
expendable.
Rehearsals are essenUal for all missions. They are held in a
realistic environment, involve the network and the Control Center, and
demonstrate flight readiness in all respects.
Prior to launch, communicaUons checks are made between the mission
vehicle and the network, to assure compatibility once the vehicle is
in orbit. In some instances, these checks may first be conducted
while the vehicle is still at the factory.
Pre-launch acUviUes and the launch itself are monitored in the
Mission Control Center, and vehicle and payload data taken during this
phase are processed and analyzed in the Center. An updated collision
avoidance run is made as a step in pre-launch processing.
Tests are conducted on the vehicle systems and payloads once orbit is
attained. The length of time allotted to such tests varies from a few
revolutions to weeks, depending on the mission1s nature and on the
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program office1s particular needs and intents.
checkouts, normal operations begin.

Following these

Drawing on mission-length pre-planning, an activity plan is composed
daily, spelling out the specHic resources -- tracking stations or
relay satellite contacts -- needed each day. Command messages are
composed and transmitted to the vehicle during contacts. Telemetry
data is retrieved, processed, and analyzed. Tracking data is reduced.
ephemerides determined and predicted. and advance planning
undertaken. These are routine efforts but most programs have special
activities as well. startracker acquisition routines for example.
Assessment of vehicle health and management of its expendables also
are part of the daily routine. Many spacecraft require stationkeeping
or orbit adjustment. to overcome the effects of perturbations and so
maintain an acceptable orbit. Planning these and executing them are
Mission Control Center tasks.
Spacecraft renab11ity has increased greatly since early years of
space flight. Occasionally. however. anomalous behavior develops. In
some ins tances, it can be innocuous, but in others it can threaten
termination of the mission. The Mission Control Center must be
postured to deal promptly and effectively with these situations, and
as will be seen, this can be a major element in operating costs.
Several space vehicles have achieved truly astonishing life periods.
returning useful data after many years. Most, however, eventually run
out of some expendable, or simply outlive their usefulness. They can
at this point be shut down. The CSTC has conducted planning exercises
for retrieving vehicles with the Orbiter, and this appears to have
some potential advantages. Increasing concern within the community
over the amount of debris in space has led to consideration of
deboosting spent satellites into the ocean in untrafficed areas; the
Space Test Center plans to have the software resources to plan and
execute such deboosts safely. It is conceivable that retrieval or
deboost may be mandatory at some time in the future.
OPERATION COSTS
Space operations costs are divisible into non-recurrent and recurrent
costs. The major non-recurrent costs lie in implementation of new
operational capabilities, which include hardware modifications and new
software generation. Recurrent costs are principally those involved
in program manning, software maintenance and hardware maintenance.
The CSTC is not industrially funded; users flying spacecraft on the
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range are not charged by the number of contacts per day. The CSTC has
a budget for sustaining operational efforts and improvements in common
user equipment and software. Given adequate lead time, the CSTC will
budget such items as new communications links, if they are backed by
validated requirements.
Program planners can eliminate excessive non-recurrent costs by
talloring their missions to be compaUble wHh exisUng network
capabilHies. This use of standardized communication, tracking,
command, and telemetry systems often leads to an increase in actual
spacecraft costs. However, what is lost to more expensive spacecraft
hardware, is gained back in operations savings. For example, a
program may have access to a non-standard command system which is
inexpensive and readily available, but the cost of network hardware
and software modifications to accommodate it can run many times the
system procurement savings. By selecting a higher performance command
system compaUble wHh an exisUng network, hardware and software
savings may outweigh the cost of the new command system. Consolidated
Space Test Center personnel are available to consult wHh mission
planners, and to infuse the Center's experience into the program
concept at the outset.
CSTC space operations are run by computers. The common user software,
hosted on IBM 310 Series processors, supports routine and special
operations. InevHably, however. all programs require some unique
software suite. The sharp program manager will avoid costly
duplication of existing routines by determining what existing software
;s available and compatible wHh his mission profile. Standard
routines exist. for example. for ephemeris generation and for maneuver
and orbit adjust planning. A star catalog is resident in the
software. as are geopotential and geomagnetic models; and rendezvous
software is planned. Unnecessary costs can be incurred in building up
mission-related software, for use in development as well as in flight
operations. 1f it is not compatible with Center software and
processing equipment. Again. at a very early stage in a program.
planners are advised to consult with the CSTC on the matter of mission
unique software. and to avail themselves to existing routines and to
the CSTC's experience in helping formulate specialized software
packages.
The size of the Mission Control Center team depends on many factors.
The team is composed of Air Force Mission Directors. CSTC Mission
Controllers. and program-sponsored analysts for vehicle and payload
support. Support requirements -- the number of contacts per day. the
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amount of vehicle analysis deemed necessary. and the nature of payload
activity - determine the number of crew members. A major factor in
crew sizing lies in the satellite's reliability. The crew will have
to contend with anomalies and if these are frequent and serious. work
loads will increase. Increased workload translates to increased
manning. Often. design specialists from the vehicle or payload
contractor's facility are called into the Mission Control Center to
aid in the process. Obviously. this is costly in itself; and during
periods when anomalies are being resolved. the mission may be
suspended. which raises the IIprice per bit" of mission data.
Reliability shortcuts can be costly; inherent design features and
adequate testing are sound investments. although they may appear to be
tempting areas for economizing measures.
Standardization also plays into crew costs relative to training. If
the Mission Control Team and analysts are familiar with the vehicle
systems. retraining is confined to payload familiarization affecting
software and procedures generation costs as well. This suggests that
the Small Satellite Program, as an entity, could profit by considering
a standardized spacecraft bus (or more than one). The economies in
subsystem manufacture, and in vehicle testing, as well as in
operation. could well be worth the difficulties which always accompany
a standardization campaign. On a program-wide basis, the possibility
of sharing Mission Control Centers and, to some extent, their crews,
should also be investigated. Most of the Mission Control Centers
today handle a number of spacecraft.
Developing and building a satellite of any size will always be an
expensive proposiUon. by any standards. While many satellites may
continue providing useful data for years. as alluded to earlier, most
have to amor ti ze the i nves tment over a s pan of months. The
possibility of alleviating this by retrieving a spent spacecraft is
not a new thought: witness the WESTAR and PALAPA operaUon. The
empty Orbiter payload bays on their return to Earth deserve
attention. The difficulties are not to be minimized, but studies
suggest an attractive offset in refurbishment versus build costs.
From an overall Small Satellite Program point of view, envisioning an
on-going series of missions over several years, reusable standardized
spacecraft buses hold promise of significant economies. Whether these
should be credited to operations might be subject to debate. In any
event. the Consol idated Space Test Center planners are making
retrieval a subject of study.

-8-

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Other new developments may also reduce operational costs. The CSTC
has a set of Expert Systems planned, which will be tested off-line in
the operational environment. These, it is hoped, wnl reduce the
manpower intensity associated with many routine tasks, and make the
process of anomaly resolution more efficient. There is also a program
at the Center for incorporating new technology into vehicle analyst
workstations which should help keep crew sizes affordable. Both these
developments require strong integration with the satellite design
effort from its inception.
Data rates, and data-taking spans, present another area of interplay
between satellite design and operations considerations. Use of the
network tracking stations for low earth orbit vehicles restrict the
amount and rate of data which can be recovered at any contact, and
probably wnl require tape recorders on the satellite. Relay
satell ites such as the NASA TDRSS handle much higher rates, and
provide long contact spans; but the mission satellite using this
service requires high-grade stabilization and a pointing antenna of
considerable she. Also, competition for TDRSS services may become
keen in the future. CSTC planners are advocating an Air Force relay
system at EHF, which could ameliorate these issues; but such a system
is yet to be authorized. The CSTC is now studying the possibility of
setting out inexpensive transportable ground stations, spaced so as to
provide near-continuous coverage for spans of 30 to 40 minutes in
10w-incl1nation orbits. Development programs are under way to
increase the data rates which the network links can handle, and to
prov; de a computer fac i 1ity capable of proces s; ng very hi gh-ra te
mission data.
Lastly, a tradeoff must be addressed, particularly in Small
Satell1tes, between vehicle autonomy and crew operations. A very
simple vehicle may be an economy in manufacture and test, but may
result in operations costs which exceed the savings. Clearly,
autonomy carried past some point can offset any possible good. If the
vehicle hardware reliability is actually reduced by a collection of
fault sensors and the like, this may be negative progress. The
behavior of autonomous systems on spacecraft can be a challenge to the
operators l understanding as well, and this can lead to expensive
delays in restoring mission operations after an anomaly.
SUMMARY
In summary. the cost elements in operations which should be considered
by Small Satellite planners are the following:
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a)

design to existing operational capabilities to the greatest
extent possible; use standardized subsystems wherever a
choice exists;

b)

tailor the mission to avoid large, complex software
developments for flight support;

c)

use available
appropriate;

d)

design software which may be used in operations support for
compatibility with the Space Test Center software environment;

e)

abstain from design and test shortcuts which could reduce
vehicle operational reliability;

f)

provide a good balance between vehicle autonomy and
ground-controlled vehicle operations.

software

routines

and

services

where

Consideration of the operational environment and consultation wHh
Consolidated Space Test Center planners in the earliest phases of a
program can lead to solid economies, and make for smooth operations
from launch date on.
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